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Divorce and Remarriage: Objections Answered 34 min read
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Divorce & Remarriage/Objections Answered

Divorce and Remarriage: Objections Answered

Marriage was given for life. Jesus returned His hearers to that purpose before stating an exception to His teaching on divorce and remarriage (Matthew 19:3–9).

We believe adultery is the one ground on which the marriage bond may be dissolved and the innocent party freed to marry again. We argue for no additional ground. These answers explain that position for readers who share confidence in Scripture and the prophetic gift, while recognising that permission to divorce is not a command to do so.

Much is common ground. Marriage was given in Eden and given for life. What God has joined, no man is to put asunder. God hates divorce, and where a marriage is in trouble the first call is to repentance, forgiveness, and reconciliation. As a general rule only death ends the bond (Romans 7:2–3). The question at issue is narrower than the whole subject of marriage: whether the exception Jesus stated in Matthew 5:32 and 19:9 covers adultery, or only fornication discovered before a marriage is consummated.

The position being defended

Does allowing an exception lower the marriage standard?

An exception given by Christ is part of His standard. Recognising it is different from inventing a reason to escape an unhappy marriage. In Matthew 19, Jesus returns His hearers to creation and then states the exception in His own teaching (Matthew 19:4–9).

The Spirit of Prophecy likewise places the lifelong obligation and its exception together: “Nothing but the violation of the marriage bed can either break or annul the marriage vow” (AH 341.3). Our appeal is to recognise that stated limit, not to make marriage disposable (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

Read more: He Shall Turn the Hearts

Aren’t marriage and the Sabbath twin institutions from Eden?

Yes. Ellen White calls marriage and the Sabbath “twin institutions for the glory of God in the benefit of humanity.” We accept the divine origin and continuing importance of both; the question is what God has taught about marriage, including its stated exception (AH 340.3–4) (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

The same discussion that recalls Eden says there can be “no dissolution of the marriage tie except for unfaithfulness to the marriage vow.” The Edenic origin of marriage therefore cannot be used to exclude the exception from the teachings of the Testimony of Jesus. The Spirit of Prophecy presents the two together, and we believe both must be retained (AH 340.3–4).

Read more: He Shall Turn the Hearts

Didn’t Jesus call remarriage adultery?

Yes, but in Matthew His statement includes an exception. “Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery” (Matthew 19:9). The prohibition must be read with the qualification Jesus attached to it (Matthew 19:9).

We are not arguing that every civil divorce permits remarriage. Ellen White expressly distinguishes a legal divorce from freedom in God’s sight, naming adultery as the exception (AH 344.2–3). The question is whether the innocent party comes within that exception (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

Read more: Consider the Black Swans; Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?

Does the exception allow divorce but forbid remarriage?

We do not read it that way. Matthew 19:9 considers the combined actions of putting away a wife and marrying another; the exception appears within that statement. The question is whether remarriage following a divorce on the stated ground is included in the condemnation, not merely whether spouses may live apart.

The syntax of the verse matters here. The exception clause sits between the putting away and the marrying of another, and both actions serve the main clause, “committeth adultery.” The exception therefore governs the whole sentence. Reading it as permission to divorce but never to remarry leaves the confusing result of a marriage vow that has been dissolved and yet remains binding.

For readers who accept the Spirit of Prophecy, the practical answer is clear: “If she, or any other woman, should obtain a divorce legally on the ground that her husband was guilty of adultery, then she is free to be married to whom she chooses” (TSB 79.1; AH 344.3). That is permission to marry, not merely permission to separate (Testimonies on Sexual Behavior, Adultery, and Divorce, chapter 10).

Read more: Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?

Fornication, adultery, and betrothal

Doesn’t “fornication” exclude adultery, since Matthew lists them separately?

The objection usually rests on English dictionary definitions: fornication as an unmarried person’s sexual sin, adultery as a married person’s. Since Jesus said porneia and not moicheia, it is argued, His exception must fall outside adultery altogether. But the dictionaries are English dictionaries, and porneia is a Greek word. Its range is broader than premarital intercourse; it can include prostitution, adultery, incest, and other unlawful sexual relations. Adultery is therefore not excluded from the exception by the word itself.

The Greek Old Testament (the Septuagint) uses porneia and its related words to describe unfaithfulness within a marriage covenant. In Ezekiel 16, Jerusalem is portrayed as God’s wife, yet her subsequent unfaithfulness is repeatedly described using these terms (Ezekiel 16:8, 15, 26, 36). Similarly, Hosea 1:2 uses porneia in describing Gomer and related language for Israel’s unfaithfulness to God. Clearly, this word family is not restricted to sexual immorality among the unmarried.

That range does not mean every possible meaning is intended in every passage. Context must determine the application. Here the subject is the putting away of a wife and marriage to another, and we understand the exception as a spouse’s sexual unfaithfulness. The English distinction alone cannot establish a betrothal-only exception.

Matthew 15:19 names both “adulteries” and “fornications.” That shows the terms have distinguishable uses; it does not establish that their meanings can never overlap (Matthew 15:19). A list containing both a broad category and a particular kind within it would not be a contradiction. “Fruit” and “apples” are different expressions, but apples remain fruit. The example does not prove the meaning of porneia; it explains why appearing side by side cannot, by itself, prove that adultery is excluded from the term’s broader range.

Read more: Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?

Do we need to know Greek to understand the exception?

Studying the original language can help resolve a disputed word or sentence. It does not follow that ordinary believers must suspend judgment until they become specialists. Claims about Greek should be explained with evidence that readers can examine, rather than used to end the discussion.

The word’s range and its use in Matthew can be investigated. For readers who accept the prophetic gift, there is also the plain explanation that adultery can free a spouse from the marriage vow in God’s sight, followed by express permission to marry after legal divorce on that ground. Technical claims need to account for that counsel too.

Read more: How to Interpret the Bible Correctly

Was the exception only for betrothal, as in Joseph’s case?

That interpretation needs evidence for the word “only.” Demonstrating that an exception could apply during betrothal does not demonstrate that it cannot apply after consummation.

The fact this argument builds on is a fact, and we accept it fully. In Israel a betrothed couple were already bound to one another as husband and wife. Deuteronomy 22:23–24 calls the betrothed virgin a wife, and Matthew calls Joseph her husband and Mary his wife before they came together. Joseph did not simply cancel a modern engagement; he was minded to “put her away,” the word used for divorce (Matthew 1:18–20). Divorce before consummation existed, and Joseph’s case is one.

But this establishes that putting away could be contemplated during betrothal. It does not establish that Christ’s later exception was confined to it. Divorce for unfaithfulness during betrothal was not in dispute; the law of Moses already provided for the unfaithful betrothed. If Jesus’ exception merely permitted what no one denied, it added nothing to the debate, and a saying that adds nothing does not stagger disciples (Matthew 19:10).

The sayings themselves concern a wife. “Whosoever shall put away his wife” answers the Pharisees’ question in Matthew 19:3, which belonged to the debate over Deuteronomy 24:1, a passage about a consummated marriage, a certificate of divorce, and a second marriage. Matthew wrote for readers who knew betrothal well; had he meant betrothal exclusively, the plain word was at hand. Matthew 5:32 points the same way: the husband who puts away his wife without the stated cause “causeth her to commit adultery,” and whoever marries her “committeth adultery.” Both charges use the adultery word, and they only make sense if the bond she left was a true marriage.

Finally, the Spirit of Prophecy applies the principle to a woman whose husband has committed adultery: she may obtain a legal divorce on that ground and marry again (AH 344.3). We therefore cannot confine the exception to an unconsummated marriage.

Read more: Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?

Does adultery of the heart also permit divorce?

Jesus calls the lustful look adultery in the heart (Matthew 5:28). That is a serious moral judgment, but it does not follow that every use of the word “adultery” carries an identical consequence for the marriage bond (Matthew 5:27–32).

The position defended here concerns the physical violation of the marriage vow with another person. Ellen White speaks of “the violation of the marriage bed” as the ground that can break or annul the vow (AH 341.3). This does not excuse lust, pornography, or other betrayal; it keeps this particular appeal within the ground it is arguing (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

This may also explain why Jesus chose the wider word. Having just called the lustful look adultery of the heart, a saying “except for adultery” could have left His hearers wondering whether the look was included. Porneia names the physical act, and it also reaches the grosser perversions that a narrow word for adultery might not, so the innocent party is protected wherever the one-flesh bond has actually been violated.

Read more: Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?

The marriage bond and the law

Can anyone undo what God has joined, or does only death separate one flesh?

“What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder” is a command against putting asunder. A prohibition does not, merely by its form, establish that the prohibited act is impossible. The whole passage, including verse 9, must be considered (Matthew 19:6–9).

The objection also proves too much for the betrothal view. If the command made the bond unbreakable in itself, the divorce that view allows for fornication before consummation would be impossible as well, because it too would put asunder a covenant God had made.

God Himself gave unfaithful Israel a bill of divorce and named her adultery as the ground: “for all the causes whereby backsliding Israel committed adultery I had put her away, and given her a bill of divorce” (Jeremiah 3:8; compare Isaiah 50:1). Jeremiah 3 raises other questions, considered below, but a claim that a bond God joins can never be dissolved has to reckon with a chapter in which God speaks of divorce for the very ground Jesus names.

We agree that a person cannot dissolve a marriage in God’s sight simply by obtaining a civil decree. But the Spirit of Prophecy distinguishes that situation from adultery, which can leave a spouse free from the vow in God’s sight (AH 344.2–3). The Lawgiver’s stated exception must be considered alongside His prohibition (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

The comparison with a living body, which cannot be separated without death, expresses the seriousness of marriage, but it cannot decide the limits of the marriage obligation independently of inspired instruction. Ellen White writes that there can be “no dissolution of the marriage tie except for unfaithfulness to the marriage vow” and that violation of the marriage bed can “break or annul” the vow (AH 340.3; 341.3). Those statements must be accounted for, rather than ruled out by the analogy (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

If those statements are restricted to betrothal, that restriction still needs to be reconciled with the express permission for a woman to remarry after a legal divorce for her husband’s adultery (AH 344.3). The argument therefore cannot end with the comparison to a body (AH 344.3).

Read more: Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?

Does adultery automatically end the marriage?

We are arguing that adultery can provide grounds for release, not that every act of adultery automatically completes a divorce. The counsel allows the innocent party to obtain a legal divorce on that ground; it also discusses circumstances in which the innocent party remains. Permission to divorce should not be turned into an obligation to do so (AH 344.3; 346.2–4) (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

First Corinthians 6:15–16 explains the bodily seriousness of sexual union with another person: even union with a prostitute makes the two “one flesh.” Adultery is the one sin that unites the body to another, and the exception names that sin. This helps explain why adultery violates the marriage commitment so deeply, but it does not supply a complete divorce procedure or establish that the original marriage ends automatically (1 Corinthians 6:15–20).

What about Romans 7 and 1 Corinthians 7:39?

These passages state the lifelong marriage rule and freedom following a spouse’s death. Romans 7 uses marriage to explain a larger point about the believer’s relationship to the law; 1 Corinthians 7:39 addresses a wife’s continuing bond and a widow’s freedom (Romans 7:1–4; 1 Corinthians 7:39).

We affirm that rule. Our disagreement is with using its general statement to cancel an exception stated elsewhere. A general rule does not erase its stated exception; it presupposes one wherever the exception is stated, and here the Lord Himself states it twice. Paul chose the widow to illustrate freedom from the law, and he does not contradict his Lord. Matthew’s exception must be interpreted, not removed by treating Paul’s illustration as an exhaustive treatment of every possible circumstance.

Read more: Consider the Black Swans; Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?

Doesn’t Paul say “remain unmarried, or be reconciled”?

Yes. First Corinthians 7:10–11 commands spouses not to separate and tells a wife who has departed to remain unmarried or be reconciled. It is a direct warning against treating separation as freedom to marry someone else (1 Corinthians 7:10–11).

The passage does not discuss adultery as a ground for divorce. We therefore read its command together with Christ’s exception, rather than as a cancellation of it. Someone who leaves without the stated ground cannot simply claim the innocent party’s permission. This answer does not depend on introducing another ground from Paul’s later discussion.

Read more: Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?

Doesn’t God hate divorce?

Yes. Malachi rebukes treachery against “the wife of thy youth” and speaks against putting away. The context is the treacherous dismissal of a faithful wife without cause, which is exactly the divorce Christ’s exception forbids. That rebuke belongs in any responsible treatment of divorce; recognising an exception must not become an excuse for faithlessness (Malachi 2:14–16).

But a condemnation of divorce is not, by itself, an interpretation of every exception passage. Hating a thing does not make it impossible in every case: God Himself gave unfaithful Israel a bill of divorce (Jeremiah 3:8). Ellen White likewise condemns the trivial dismissal of wives while expressly retaining unfaithfulness as the exception (AH 340.3–341.2). We understand those teachings together, not as competing standards (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

Wasn’t divorce just a concession to hard hearts?

Jesus says Moses permitted putting away because of hardness of heart. He then says, “And I say unto you,” and gives His instruction, including the exception (Matthew 19:8–9). That is the formula He uses when He magnifies the law. If the exception were the Mosaic concession carried over, verse 9 would say nothing new, since the whole dispute was already about what Moses allowed. The exception is part of His answer, not merely a quotation of what Moses allowed (Matthew 19:8–9).

Matthew 5 makes the distinction particularly clear: “It hath been said” introduces the certificate provision, while “But I say unto you” introduces Christ’s instruction with its exception. The exception also follows immediately after He deepened the seventh commandment itself (Matthew 5:27–28): the command He had just magnified is the command whose violation He names as the ground that touches the bond. We therefore do not think the exception can be dismissed merely by labelling it the same concession He is correcting. It belongs within the teaching in which He magnifies the marriage obligation (Matthew 5:31–32).

Isaiah 42:21 says the Messiah “will magnify the law, and make it honourable.” A concession to hard hearts makes the law less honourable; this exception makes it more. Hillel’s school read Deuteronomy 24:1 as permitting divorce for any cause a husband disliked, while Shammai’s school held that the ground was sexual unfaithfulness. Jesus swept away the any-cause divorce and left the one ground. His restriction was a magnification of the law, not a relaxation of it.

Read more: Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?; He Shall Turn the Hearts

Why were the disciples so shocked?

Their reaction shows that Christ’s teaching was demanding. It does not establish that verse 9 contained no exception: Matthew records the exception immediately before their response, “it is not good to marry” (Matthew 19:9–10).

The dispute involved divorce “for every cause,” against a background of competing interpretations of the grounds for divorce. A teaching that rejects easy divorce can be stringent even while retaining an exception for sexual unfaithfulness. The end of any-cause divorce would explain their dismay far better than a betrothal technicality, which no one would find staggering. Even so, we would not claim the disciples’ surprise, by itself, proves exactly how they understood every part of the answer.

Jesus’ following words about eunuchs recognise celibacy and speak of receiving that calling. They should not be used to remove the exception He has just stated, or to assume that every innocent divorced spouse is being addressed as permanently forbidden to marry (Matthew 19:9–12).

Doesn’t the death penalty rule out divorce for adultery?

The Mosaic law’s death penalty and Christ’s divorce teaching are related questions, but one cannot substitute for interpreting the other. Deuteronomy 22 prescribes death for the sexual offences described there; the fact that death ends a marriage does not independently establish what follows when the guilty spouse remains alive (Deuteronomy 22:22–24).

If anything, the penalty points in the same direction as the exception. Execution for adultery ended the marriage by death, and on the objection’s own principle that only death severs the bond, the wronged spouse was then free to marry again. Moses’ law did not leave the innocent party bound for life to an adulterer.

Nor does the existence of that penalty demonstrate that Christ’s exception must concern betrothal alone: Deuteronomy 22 also attaches a death penalty to the betrothal offence it describes. The timing distinction does not, by itself, resolve the difficulty. The meaning of Christ’s instruction still has to be established from His words (Deuteronomy 22:22–24).

Did Moses permit divorce but never remarriage?

Deuteronomy 24:1–4 describes a woman leaving after a certificate of divorce, becoming another man’s wife, and then being forbidden to return to the first husband after the second marriage ends. Verse 2 says she “may go and be another man’s wife,” and verses 3–4 treat the second marriage as a real marriage and a return to the first husband as defilement. If the second union were adultery and the first bond unbroken, the passage would require her to remain in what the objection calls adultery while forbidding her return to her lawful husband (Deuteronomy 24:1–4).

That does not make every Mosaic divorce an example for Christians. Jesus expressly distinguishes His teaching from what was permitted because of hardness of heart, and the hardness He addressed was the any-cause exploitation of the certificate. The narrower point is that “Moses allowed divorce but no remarriage” does not adequately describe Deuteronomy.

Read more: Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?

Reading the Gospel accounts together

Doesn’t the exception lack a second witness in Mark and Luke?

Mark 10 and Luke 16 state the prohibition without Matthew’s qualification. Matthew records the exception in both 5:32 and 19:9. Reading the accounts together requires accounting for both the prohibition and the qualification, rather than treating silence in one account as a denial of what another says. A general rule is not the enemy of its exception: Mark moves from the specific question toward the creation principle, while Matthew gives the principle and then the exception. That is omission, not contradiction.

The witness principle governed the establishment of charges in court (Deuteronomy 17:6). It should not become a device for discarding inspired teaching because it appears in fewer accounts. The appeal article examines how counting Gospel writers against Matthew can lead to setting aside a qualification actually present in the text (The Final Deception, “When the Text Itself Has to Go”).

Moreover, Matthew records the exception in two separate teachings and in two different constructions: “saving for the cause of fornication” (parektos logou porneias, 5:32) and “except it be for fornication” (mē epi porneia, 19:9). That observation does not require calling them independent eyewitnesses in the technical sense. It simply means the exception is not an isolated phrase occurring only once, and its meaning must be considered in both settings (Matthew 5:32; 19:9). For readers who accept the prophetic gift, the Testimony of Jesus adds a further witness, quoting the exception as Christ’s plain teaching (see below).

Read more: Consider the Black Swans

Was the exception added by later scribes?

That allegation requires textual evidence, not just an argument that the exception is difficult to reconcile with a preferred interpretation. “The Final Deception” documents an SDARM booklet’s claim that the phrase was introduced later, and examines the doctrinal reasoning used to reach that conclusion (The Final Deception, “When the Text Itself Has to Go”).

The exception remains in the NET, ESV, and NKJV texts of Matthew 19:9. There are textual variants around this verse, including its concluding wording, so it would be careless to say there are no variants at all. But a variant in one part of the verse is not evidence that the whole exception should be deleted.

For readers who accept the prophetic gift, there is a further question: Ellen White quotes the exception and introduces it as what “Jesus declared plainly.” A theory that removes it must account for that endorsement, not simply leave it unexplained (TSB 79.2) (Ellen White’s statement). This is a response to the objection’s reasoning, not an exhaustive manuscript study.

Read more: He Shall Turn the Hearts

Was the exception only for Jewish hearers?

An original Jewish audience is relevant to understanding the question Jesus was answering. It does not establish that His answer has no authority beyond that audience. In Matthew 19 He grounds the marriage obligation in creation, not merely in a local privilege (Matthew 19:3–9).

Ellen White also applies the adultery exception to the cases before her and expressly permits remarriage under the stated conditions. Restricting Christ’s exception to Jews therefore does not explain her application of it to Christian believers (AH 344.2–3) (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

Reconciliation, suffering, and historical examples

Didn’t God still call Himself married after divorcing Israel?

Yes. Jeremiah 3 contains both the bill of divorce in verse 8 and “I am married unto you” in verse 14. Both belong in the discussion. We would not use verse 8 alone to settle every question about the legal effect of divorce, or explain away verse 14 because it complicates the argument (Jeremiah 3).

The chapter shows judgment for unfaithfulness together with a continuing invitation to return. It does not directly rule on an innocent spouse’s freedom to marry another person. We would not use the bill of divorce alone to prove that remarriage is always right, just as the invitation to return is not sufficient to prove that it is always forbidden. We therefore rest that specific case on Christ’s exception and the explicit Spirit of Prophecy counsel, rather than making the prophetic marriage illustration carry the whole conclusion (Jeremiah 3, TSB 79.1).

Read more: Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?

If an adulterous spouse can be taken back, must forgiveness always mean reunion?

Hosea and David’s recovery of Michal are raised as evidence that restoration can follow marital unfaithfulness or another union. We agree that reconciliation should be sought wherever it is possible and appropriate; the exception permits divorce, it does not command it. But the possibility of taking someone back and the obligation never to be released are different propositions. A case for reconciliation does not, by itself, settle whether the innocent party may instead exercise the exception.

We would not treat a prophetic enacted illustration or a royal household’s history as a complete legal ruling on every Christian marriage. The direct counsel already quoted permits the innocent party to marry after a legal divorce for adultery, while other counsel urges patience and considers the welfare of the injured spouse and children (AH 344.3; 346.2–4). Those explicit statements should guide the use of the examples, not be displaced by them (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

Forgiveness and the restoration of a shared home should not be treated as identical decisions. The Spirit of Prophecy urges reconciliation in some cases, yet in another tells a mistreated wife, “I cannot advise you to return … unless you see decided changes in him” (AH 343.2). That counsel must not be converted into a new ground for remarriage; it does show why a general demand to return can be irresponsible (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

In one case Ellen White went further. In the 1860s Maryetta Waggoner, the wife of J. H. Waggoner, was unfaithful to him, and he later took her back. In 1872 Ellen White wrote to him:

“The law of God and the laws of the land freed you from your wife, but this golden opportunity you let pass, and you voluntarily went back to your wife, fastening the chains of bondage upon yourself. When you went back to her bed, you displeased God and weakened your own soul. In this you followed not the light of God, but your own inclinations.”

2LtMs, Lt 3, 1872, par. 8.

The wider history of the Waggoner household should be read before drawing conclusions from this letter, and it does not make divorce a duty for every injured spouse. But it plainly says that the law of God, not merely the civil law, had freed him from his wife, and it treats his return as following his own inclinations rather than the light of God. That cannot be reconciled with the claim that adultery leaves the marriage bond untouched in God’s sight, or that reunion is always the only faithful course (the editors’ biographical note on Waggoner).

After adultery, the innocent party’s position also requires consideration of repentance and the consequences for the spouse and children (AH 346.1–4). Recognising the exception is not a command to divorce, and advocating forgiveness is not permission to ignore those circumstances (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

Read more: He Shall Turn the Hearts

Aren’t hard cases being used to make bad law?

Painful circumstances cannot authorise us to create an exception God has not given. But hardship is not the basis of this appeal. We believe Christ Himself stated the exception, and the question is what His words mean.

Matthew records the exception alongside demanding teaching about marriage and celibacy. The difficulty of obedience does not prove an interpretation wrong, but neither does an interpretation’s severity prove it right. The question must be answered from the teaching and the inspired counsel, not from sympathy alone or from an assumption that the hardest answer must be the faithful one (Matthew 19:9–12, AH 344.2–3). The hard case actually in view is the one a blanket rule creates: an innocent party bound for life to a covenant the other party has broken, by a law Christ never laid down.

Marriage pictures the love of God, and Jeremiah 3 shows that His continuing love for His people did not prevent Him from judging their unfaithfulness. Nothing is worth setting aside the law of love, and we believe the exception belongs to that law. It was stated by the Lawgiver Himself, twice, in the act of magnifying the commandment that guards the marriage bed, and it stands as a protection for the covenant and for the wronged party within it.

Read more: The Glory of the Lord vs. the Glory of the Letter

Doesn’t historic church practice settle the question?

Historical practice may help explain how a position developed, but it cannot substitute for interpreting the texts. The fact that a church or respected person adopted a strict position does not establish that every part of that position follows from Christ’s words. An institution’s practice in a given century is not exegesis; the same method would prove purgatory by the thirteenth century and its opposite by the sixteenth.

Our appeal therefore does not depend on whether the Church of England, as in the case of Princess Margaret, a Reformer, or a contemporary teacher agrees with it. It depends on the exception as recorded in Matthew and the counsel expressly addressing remarriage after adultery (Matthew 19 discussion, TSB 79.1).

Read more: When Should We “Yield to Their Judgment”?; Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?

The Testimony of Jesus

Does Ellen White actually permit remarriage after adultery?

Yes. Her statement does not stop with separation or civil divorce:

“I saw that Sister Jones, as yet, has no right to marry another man; but if she, or any other woman, should obtain a divorce legally on the ground that her husband was guilty of adultery, then she is free to be married to whom she chooses.”

TSB 79.1; compare AH 344.3 (the published statement).

The conditional wording matters. She does not grant unrestricted freedom to every divorced person. She names the husband’s adultery, legal divorce on that ground, and the woman’s resulting freedom to marry. An interpretation forbidding every remarriage while the former spouse lives must explain this counsel directly (TSB 78.4–79.1).

The same counsel identifies the ground in the plainest terms: “There is only one sin, which is adultery, which can place the husband or wife in a position where they can be free from the marriage vow in the sight of God” (AH 344.2). Elsewhere she writes that “nothing but the violation of the marriage bed can either break or annul the marriage vow” (AH 341.3). The word annul is hers (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

Her earlier published account also names adultery: “Christ would have the marriage relation hedged about with judicial restrictions, so that there could be no legal separation between husband and wife, save for the cause of adultery” (2SP 221.1). Her own word there is adultery, which on the objection’s own definitions is a married person’s unfaithfulness. That sentence alone concerns separation, so we would not make it say everything about remarriage. Read alongside the express permission, however, it cannot support the claim that she excluded adultery from Christ’s exception (The Spirit of Prophecy, volume 2, p. 221).

In Thoughts From the Mount of Blessing she quotes Matthew 5:32 in full, exception clause included, and introduces it with “Jesus declared plainly” (MB 63.1). The statement sits in her chapter on the spirituality of the law, where the Sermon on the Mount is the law magnified. She presents the clause as Christ’s plain teaching, not as a puzzle or a regrettable allowance. Reading “unfaithfulness to the marriage vow” as unfaithfulness before the marriage was finalised adds a restriction her words do not contain.

Read more: Does God Allow Remarriage After Divorce?

Should only her “published works” be considered?

The statement usually cited appears in a chapter called “Unfounded Reports.” It tells readers not to trust unauthenticated reports about what Sister White had done, said, or written, and directs them to her published works. Its immediate contrast is between reliable writings and hearsay, not between inspired books and necessarily uninspired letters (5T 696 discussed in The Final Deception).

Authentication and context still matter. But publication history alone does not establish the inspiration or irrelevance of a letter. In any event, the exception appears in Thoughts From the Mount of Blessing, and the express remarriage permission is reproduced in The Adventist Home and Testimonies on Sexual Behavior, Adultery, and Divorce (AH 340.3; 344.3, TSB 79.1–2).

Could this have been her personal opinion, and does “I saw” settle it?

Ellen White did distinguish ordinary information and personal opinion from specially inspired counsel. It would therefore be wrong to argue that every sentence she ever wrote was a revelation. But it is equally wrong to classify unwelcome counsel as opinion merely because it conflicts with an established position (The Final Deception, “Was It Just Her Opinion?”).

She warned against treating material supporting cherished ideas as divine while dismissing correction as “Sister White’s opinions” (3SM 68). The distinction needs evidence from the statement and its context, not the convenience of its conclusion. A claim that the marriage counsel is merely opinion must show why (3SM 68 discussed in the article).

For the same reason, the expression “I saw” should be read in context, not used as a mechanical test for every sentence. Here the question is the authority and meaning of the whole passage, including the distinction between civil divorce and freedom in God’s sight, followed by “I saw” and the explicit permission under the stated condition (TSB 78.4–79.1) (the complete passage).

Removing the words “I saw” from consideration would not remove the actual counsel that follows. Anyone rejecting its authority still needs a contextual reason for doing so. Neither accepting nor rejecting a statement should depend on a two-word formula alone (principles for distinguishing opinion and inspired counsel).

Was the counsel only local, or limited by time, place, or church decision?

Time, place, addressee, and circumstances must be considered. The mistake is to use “context” as a general exemption from counsel without showing what in the context changes its application. That is one of the interpretive methods examined in “The Final Deception” (the article’s discussion).

The wording is not merely a report that a state court granted someone a divorce. It expressly distinguishes the laws of the land from “the sight of God,” and extends the condition beyond the named woman: “she, or any other woman” (TSB 78.4–79.1). Those features do not eliminate every application question, but they do resist confining the principle to one person or one state. A civil-law-only or restricted reading needs to explain that broader wording (the complete passage).

The allegation that the counsel lacks authority because of when a church considered the subject needs its own documentary evidence. The allegation alone cannot establish that the counsel was uninspired. A complete historical answer would require the dated testimony and the relevant church records; the wording itself gives no rule that it became valid only after a collective decision (the objections documented in The Final Deception, the counsel itself).

Didn’t she refuse to advise on divorce cases?

In some individual cases she declined to give a definite judgment because she lacked particular light or sufficient knowledge. The Wales material also records her reluctance to have complicated cases brought to her. Those statements must be read with their particular subjects and limitations (the Wales material quoted in the appeal essay).

The White Estate’s preface to TSB is important here. It quotes W. C. White’s warning against turning her counsel into a rule for settling every complicated marriage case, and stresses that no manual can cover them all. We accept that caution: recognising an express permission does not make this article a universal case-management code. But declining to settle every case does not erase counsel she actually gave in others (TSB preface, pp. 6–7).

Doesn’t the “weight of evidence” favour no remarriage?

Evidence should be weighed, but weighing is not simply counting general statements against an explicit qualification. Many statements that marriage is for life can stand alongside a statement identifying the exceptional circumstance. The two must first be read together before declaring a contradiction.

The same published chapter of The Adventist Home contains both the lifelong obligation and the exception, as well as the express remarriage permission. Selecting only the stricter-sounding lines would not represent the whole chapter (AH 340–344). The appeal article raises the corresponding problem of counting Gospel accounts against Matthew’s qualification (The Adventist Home, chapter 56, The Final Deception).

Read more: Consider the Black Swans; How to Interpret the Bible Correctly

Could progressive light require a higher SDARM standard?

A claim of greater light must explain how it relates to what God has already revealed. Ellen White writes: “When the power of God testifies as to what is truth, that truth is to stand forever as the truth. No after suppositions contrary to the light God has given are to be entertained” (1SM 161.1). That is a serious obstacle to describing the reversal of explicit counsel as progress (quotation and discussion in The Final Deception).

We understand the Elijah commission as a call to restoration and faithfulness, not an independent authority to cancel Christ’s stated exception. The appeal’s essay on that commission develops the distinction between restoring relationships and simply imposing a prohibition (He Shall Turn the Hearts).

The claim that this counsel applied only while the SDA Church was God’s church needs more than a change of denominational setting. Ellen White describes Christ’s law of marriage as applying to “all the children of Adam to the close of time,” while also retaining the exception. We cannot find a denominational expiry date in that explanation, and a later movement’s claim to restoration does not supply one (AH 340.3–4) (The Adventist Home, chapter 56).

Read more: New Light? Old? Or Just Plain Wrong?

Doesn’t John’s rebuke of Herod prove remarriage is forbidden?

John told Herod, “It is not lawful for thee to have thy brother’s wife” (Mark 6:18). His rebuke concerns the particular union with Herodias, identified as his brother Philip’s wife; Leviticus also expressly forbids taking a brother’s wife. It does not describe an innocent spouse exercising Christ’s exception after adultery (Mark 6:17–20; Leviticus 18:16; 20:21).

We agree that an Elijah message must confront unlawful unions, even at great cost. But the fact that one remarriage was unlawful does not prove that every remarriage is unlawful. Faithfulness to John’s example requires condemning what God condemns without cancelling the exception Christ states (Matthew 19:4–9).

Read more: He Shall Turn the Hearts

Didn’t Ellen White call Harper’s remarriage an evil?

The phrase “two evils instead of curing one” comes from counsel to his second mother-in-law against separating the couple. In the same passage Ellen White says, “Your daughter has married Walter, and there is no reason why she should be separated from him,” and says there is no just excuse for their ceasing to live together as husband and wife (Letter 50, 1895; TSB 73.3) (the letter in Testimonies on Sexual Behavior, Adultery, and Divorce).

The letter also addresses the mother’s request for money for her son’s education. It does not explicitly enumerate the “two evils,” so we would be cautious about assigning an exact meaning to each one. What is clear is that she defends the marriage, says Scripture does not forbid him to marry again in the Lord, and opposes separating the couple. Reading the disputed phrase as a condemnation of the marriage conflicts with those express statements (Letter 50, 1895, in Testimonies on Sexual Behavior, Adultery, and Divorce).

Read more: Wales, Harper, and Caldwell

Was Harper allowed to remarry only because he was a eunuch?

His physical condition is acknowledged in the published material. But the letter first explains that his wife left him, divorced him, and married another man, and then says, “I see nothing in the Scripture that forbids him to marry again in the Lord.” It also recognises his right to the affection of a woman who knows his condition (Letter 50, 1895; TSB 68.2) (the published counsel and introductory note).

The letter does not state that a physical disability creates an exception to the marriage law, or that the new union is permissible only because it cannot be consummated. We would not insert either condition. The relevant distinction is between this permitted remarriage and a union that Scripture condemns, not between physically able and disabled spouses (the Harper and Caldwell discussion, Letter 50, 1895).

Does using Ellen White put her above the Bible?

We are distinguishing Scripture from our interpretation of it. If we accept that the same God speaks through Scripture and the prophetic gift, we must allow inspired counsel to expose an error in our reading. That is not the same as granting a human opinion authority over Scripture.

Ellen White warned about those who “put their own interpretation upon the Word, and make it contradict what the Lord has revealed in the testimonies” (Letter 12, 1890, paragraph 46). That warning was addressed to people who professed confidence in her prophetic gift, which makes it particularly relevant to those of us in SDARM. If we profess confidence in the Testimony of Jesus, we must be willing to receive its correction, including when it challenges our existing position (quotation and context in The Final Deception).

Read more: How to Interpret the Bible Correctly

Practical questions

Does this give the guilty party the same freedom?

No such conclusion follows from the innocent party’s permission. In the historical counsel discussed on this site, Harper’s case is distinguished from Caldwell’s; a civil divorce did not automatically give Caldwell a moral right to marry again. The cases should be read in context rather than flattened into either “every divorce frees everyone” or “no divorce frees anyone” (the Harper and Caldwell correspondence).

The words to Caldwell, “If your wife has obtained a divorce from you, that does not leave you free to marry again,” need their context. Ellen White also says that he had provoked his wife, left her, and pursued another woman while still bound to her. This was a judgment about his conduct and proposed marriage, not a declaration cancelling the permission given in the different circumstances of Harper’s case. The testimonies distinguish the innocent from the guilty, which a blanket rule cannot do (Letters 14, 1895, and 19, 1896, quoted in the case study).

Won’t people abuse the exception, and who decides who is innocent?

Deliberately arranging or committing adultery to escape a marriage would be an abuse of the exception. Our argument gives no assurance that someone who engineers the wrong can then claim the innocent party’s permission. The counsel distinguishing Harper from Caldwell shows why responsibility for the breakdown matters, rather than the civil divorce alone. That possibility calls for careful investigation; it does not authorise us to erase a permission Christ gave (the Harper and Caldwell correspondence).

A person’s claim cannot settle the question by itself. Proverbs warns against answering before hearing a matter and against accepting the first account without examination. The Wales correspondence also points to people who knew the case and could observe the person’s conduct, rather than a distant judgment made without sufficient knowledge (Proverbs 18:13, 17, the Wales correspondence).

We would oppose both a blanket prohibition that denies the innocent party’s freedom and an automatic approval based on an untested accusation. At minimum, we would expect responsible church leaders to hear both accounts where possible, examine relevant testimony and records, distinguish established adultery from suspicion, consider the sequence of events, and protect the privacy of those involved. We offer those as safeguards, not as a description of an adopted SDARM procedure. No checklist can replace prayerful judgment, and this article does not set a formal evidential threshold or decide a particular person’s case (the distinction between civil and divine freedom, the need for individual study and spiritual guidance in the TSB preface).

What if the guilty spouse later repents?

Repentance must never be treated as hopeless. Scripture promises forgiveness and cleansing to those who confess their sins, and Ellen White discusses the restoration to church fellowship of people who have committed adultery after sincere repentance. Neither statement, by itself, establishes a right to marry someone else (1 John 1:9, AH 346.1 and the compilers’ qualification).

We therefore distinguish forgiveness, reconciliation, church membership, and freedom to remarry. This appeal defends the innocent party’s permission; it does not grant the guilty party an equivalent permission merely by adding repentance to the facts. More complicated later circumstances require their own careful consideration, rather than an automatic approval or a claim that forgiveness itself is unavailable (the explicit permission, the TSB preface).

Written by
Gerson Robles

Gerson Robles runs Listapage, a Perth-based studio that designs, builds and hosts websites. He has been a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Reform Movement since 2000, serving the church as a Bible worker and then as an ordained elder for 13 years before stepping away from church work as a matter of conscience and starting his own business. Gerson continues to serve in a local capacity in his home church, giving Bible studies and sermons and taking part in the church’s mission activities.

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